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I.

INTRODUCTION

[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the
Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they
actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection.
Aliens are no more parties to the laws than they are parties
to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they
owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled,
in return, to their protection and advantage.
– James Madison1
The debate over what constitutional rights, if any, aliens retain while
in the United States is one that seems to have been raging since the founding of the nation itself and is still very much in debate. The word “citizen,”
however, is almost tellingly nowhere defined in the U.S. Constitution, and
the Preamble articulates, “We the People of the United States” not, “We the
1. JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 556 (2d ed. 1836).
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Citizens of the United States.”2 This, on the other hand, leads us to a question with seemingly no definite or agreed-upon answer: who exactly are
“the people”? More specifically, do undocumented persons qualify as part
of “the people”?
In the summer of 2011, the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Portillo-Munoz that undocumented persons are not entitled to the protections of
the Second Amendment to the Constitution.3 Although part of the court’s
reasoning was based on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5),4 its decision also turned on
the belief that the meaning of the phrase “the people” in the Second
Amendment5 did not encompass undocumented persons.6 The PortilloMunoz court relied, in part, on the language of the Supreme Court in District of Colombia v. Heller,7 which found that the phrase “the people” in the
Second Amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of that community.”8 The Portillo-Munoz
court, however, diverged with the Supreme Court in that it held that the
Second Amendment is an affirmative right granted to one by the government,9 whereas the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment, like
the First and Fourth,10 codifies a pre-existing, individual right.11 How could
2.

Id.

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 36 (1975):
The Preamble speaks of ‘We the [P]eople of the United States,’ not, as it
might have, of we the citizens of the United States at the time of the
formation of this union. And the Bill of Rights throughout defines the
rights of people, not of citizens. In the First Amendment, it is ‘the right
of the people peaceably to assemble,’ in the Second, ‘the right of the
people to keep and bear arms,’ whatever that might mean. And so on. No
wonder, then, that citizenship was nowhere defined in the constitution.

3. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (stating that it is unlawful for any person illegally or
unlawfully in the United States to possess any firearm or ammunition).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
(emphasis added)).
6. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.
7. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
8. Id. at 580 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265
(1990)).
9. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 441.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”) (emphasis added)).
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a pre-existing, individual right not dependent upon the Constitution for its
guarantee be restricted to only citizens?
This Note argues that Portillo-Munoz’s reading of the Second
Amendment’s interpretation of “the people,” as implying that “the people”
exclusively encompasses only citizens, is erroneous with how the phrase
“the people” is similarly situated in the Fourth Amendment. As set out in
Heller, the two amendments have been tied together in purpose as asserting
a basic right of persons against governmental intrusion.12 In the same vein,
contrary to what the Portillo-Munoz court asserts, undocumented persons
have been held to retain certain Fourth Amendment rights, thus, by implication, to be included in “the people” therein.13 Thus, the Second Amendment’s reading of “the people” should logically extend to undocumented
persons.
Before embarking on the argument that the meaning of “the people” in
the Second Amendment is similar to the meaning of “the people” in the
Fourth Amendment, this Note will provide an overview of the PortilloMunoz case. An overview of the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Dennis
in that case is then provided since this Note essentially sides with the dissent.
Other background information necessarily concerns the Heller case.
This is not only important because of the Portillo-Munoz court’s reliance on
this case to disqualify undocumented persons from “the people” under the
Second Amendment but also, as mentioned above, because of the Supreme
Court’s affirmation that the Second Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, is an individual, pre-existing right.14
Also made clear is that Congress has plenary power over immigration
law as per the Constitution.15 As Circuit Judge Dennis argued in his dissenting opinion, “whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) violates the Second Amendment is a separate question from whether Portillo-Munoz is part of ‘the
people’ who have . . . Second[] and Fourth Amendment rights.”16 This Note
does not argue the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) but, instead,
11. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591.
12. Id.
13. See Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008); see also
Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22
F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Juarez-Torres, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D.N.M. 2006).
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591.
15. Congress has power to regulate immigration laws as per the Commerce Clause,
the Naturalization Clause, the Migration and Importation Clause, and the War Power, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
16. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2011).
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argues against the imprecision of finding that undocumented persons are
not part of “the people” in the Second Amendment.
After providing this background information, the central argument is
set forth. In making the case that undocumented persons retain constitutional rights, this Note first asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment’s language
of “person” encompasses undocumented persons.17 In laying out case law
verifying this assertion, particular focus is put on the Supreme Court decision of Plyler v. Doe, which addresses the “personhood” of undocumented
persons under the Equal Protection Clause.18
After establishing that undocumented persons already have recognized
rights under the Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment’s applicability to the undocumented person is argued. The Portillo-Munoz court asserted that there is no “precedent for the proposition
that illegal aliens generally are covered by the Fourth Amendment.”19 This
pronouncement, however, is at odds with cases such as United States of
America v. Juarez-Torres, which recently wrote that “the cloak of Fourth
Amendment protection does not discriminate between United States citizens
and illegal aliens.”20
That being said, there is a slight inconsistency with the assertion of
some courts that undocumented persons retain Fourth Amendment rights
and the “test” set out by the Supreme Court in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez.21 This test sets out that in order to qualify for personhood under
the Fourth Amendment, and by implication to the Second Amendment, “the
people” “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community.”22
Lastly, after asserting that undocumented persons retain Fourteenth
Amendment protections as persons and that, arguably, they retain Fourth
Amendment protections, the foundational argument of this Note will be laid
17.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
18. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
19. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
20. United States v. Juarez-Torres, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1121-22 (D.N.M. 2006)
(emphasis added).
21. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
22. Id.
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out. That is, undocumented persons, by reason of their being considered as
part of “the people” under the Fourth Amendment, are considered part of
“the people” under the Second Amendment. This will be done by hearkening back to the foundations and purpose of the amendments as written in
the Heller case as well as others.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE PORTILLO-MUNOZ MAJORITY

In an opinion written by Circuit Judge Garwood, the Fifth Circuit held
that the defendant-appellant Armando Portillo-Munoz, an undocumented
person, was not included in the Second Amendment’s phrase “the people,”
and therefore, that he violated the law by carrying a gun.23
Factually, Armando Portillo-Munoz was found with a .22 caliber
handgun and indicated the gun was for killing coyotes, as he was working
as a ranch hand and it was utilized for defending his employer’s chickens.24
Portillo-Munoz, however, was found to be, and admitted to being, illegally
present in the country, first coming into the United States for six months
and illegally reentering in 2009, this time for a year and six months before
being found with the handgun.25
The court held that Portillo-Munoz’s conduct unquestionably violated
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).26 But, what of his constitutional right to bear arms?
In finding that Portillo-Munoz had no constitutional right to bear arms, the
court relied on the Supreme Court’s language in Heller and applied it to
undocumented persons; it stated, “[undocumented persons] are not ‘lawabiding, responsible citizens’ or ‘members of the political community,’”
nor “Americans,” since the Heller case used the term multiple times.27
Since the Supreme Court established the analysis of “the people” in
the Fourth Amendment would extend to the Second Amendment,28 the Portillo-Munoz court used Verdugo-Urquidez’s analysis to determine that the
Second Amendment also “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
23. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.
24. Id. at 438-39.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 439.
27. Id. at 440 (relying on language from Heller stating “[w]e start therefore with a
strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs
to all Americans,” the Portillo-Munoz court found that undocumented persons do not qualify
as “Americans” as referred to in Heller (emphasis added) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 644 (2008))).
28. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
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with this country to be considered part of that community.”29 Determining
that the Supreme Court had not extended Fourth Amendment rights to undocumented persons, the court felt that those rights naturally did not extend
in the Second Amendment context.30
Even if undocumented persons were found to retain Fourth Amendment rights, the court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment and Second
Amendment were contrary in purpose31: “The Second Amendment grants
an affirmative right to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is
at its core a protective right against abuses by the government.”32 PortilloMunoz then mentioned that “[a]ttempts to precisely analogize the scope of
the two amendments is misguided” and wrote that there are “compelling
reasons” for denying the right, including undocumented persons’ ease in
circumventing detection and “already living outside the law” creates a more
significant likelihood that they would “resort to illegal activities to maintain
a livelihood.”33 In acknowledging the constitutionality of the statute under
which Portillo-Munoz was convicted,34 the court pointed out that Congress
has the authority to “regularly make[] rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.”35
Ultimately, the court found that Portillo-Munoz did not retain a Second Amendment right because he was not included as part of “the people.”36 In laying this foundation, the court established that section 922(g)(5)
was thus constitutional.37
B.

THE PORTILLO-MUNOZ DISSENT

Dissenting in the majority’s holding of Portillo-Munoz’s Second
Amendment claim, Circuit Judge Dennis wrote that “whether 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(5) violates the Second Amendment is a separate question from
whether Portillo-Munoz is part of ‘the people’ who have First, Second, and
Fourth Amendment rights.”38 To hold that Portillo-Munoz is not a part of
“the people” would have “far reaching consequences”;39 in effect, it would
mean that “millions of similarly situated residents of the United States are
29. Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 441.
33. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 441 (quoting United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115,
128-29 (2d Cir. 1984)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)).
36. Id. at 442.
37. Id.
38. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
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‘non-persons’ who have no rights to be free from unjustified searches of
their homes and bodies and other abuses . . . .”40
Finding the majority’s endeavor to label the Second Amendment an
“affirmative right” and the Fourth Amendment a “protective right” as unpersuasive, Judge Dennis referred to Heller in asserting that both rights
assert a fundamental notion that one should be free from governmental infringement.41 In essence, he asserted that both set out protective rights: one
to be free from governmental invasion without foundation and the other
against governmental contravention on the right to bear arms.42
Also, noting that those similarly situated to Portillo-Munoz have been
held to retain Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as “persons” under
the Constitution,43 Judge Dennis found it odd that simply because “the people” is the plural form of “persons” that the same subset of people were not
intended to be covered under the Second and Fourth Amendments.44 The
difference in the protection of rights simply because of the difference in
meaning between “people” and “person” thus seemed unusual to the
judge.45
Judge Dennis also called into question the applicability of the precedents the court used in arriving at its conclusion.46 In first referencing Heller, the judge pointed out that the Supreme Court decision never addressed
the adaptation of the Second Amendment to noncitizens.47 As the Heller
Court had used the “substantial connections” language in VerdugoUrquidez to determine who “the people” were in the Second Amendment,
Judge Dennis also pointed out the court’s error in disqualifying PortilloMunoz under this test.48 Finding that “[n]othing in Verdugo-Urquidez requires that the alien must be lawfully present in the United States in order to
establish substantial connections,”49 Judge Dennis wrote that the VerdugoUrquidez Court suggested that even the presence of someone in the country

40. Id.
41. Id. at 444.
42. Id.
43. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 445 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (referring to Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
44. Id.
45. Id. (judge noting it as “strange”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 445-46 (under Verdugo-Urquidez, an alien secures
“substantial connections” and is thus a part of the people when he or she first, is willingly
present in the United States and second, accepts some “societal obligations”) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
49. Id. at 446.
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for a “matter of days” would make them eligible for protection under the
Fourth Amendment.50
In making the case that Portillo-Munoz would qualify as part of “the
people” under the Verdugo-Urquidez “substantial connections” test, Judge
Dennis established that Portillo-Munoz, as per the first prong of the test,
came to the United States voluntarily.51 It was also undisputed, Judge Dennis wrote, that Portillo-Munoz had taken on societal obligations.52 After all,
he had been working as a ranch hand for a steady six months when he was
arrested (acquiring the firearm in the first place to protect his employer’s
chickens), and prior to that, he had also worked at a dairy farm.53 Similarly,
Portillo-Munoz paid rent and economically supported his girlfriend and her
child.54 Further, Judge Dennis brought up the fact that to unlawfully enter
the country is a misdemeanor55 but that Portillo-Munoz had no criminal
history and that “[m]any United States citizens have committed far more
serious crimes, yet they still receive the constitutional protections given to
‘the people.’”56
In bringing up all of these points, Judge Dennis established that, essentially, Portillo-Munoz was a member of the community.57As a member of
the community, Portillo-Munoz and people similarly situated should qualify
as part of “the people” who are privileged to the assurances of not only the
Fourth Amendment, but the Second Amendment as well.58
C.

THE HELLER DECISION AND “THE PEOPLE”

The Supreme Court decision of District of Colombia v. Heller firmly
established the constitutionality of the individual right to bear arms.59 Although the Court never answered the question of whether undocumented
persons have the right to bear arms, as the dissent wrote in PortilloMunoz,60 it seems the Court tried to narrow the applicability of the
Amendment as well.61 Nevertheless, the Court also establishes that the right

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
1325(a)).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990)).
Id. at 447.
Id.
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 447 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (to unlawfully enter the United States is a misdemeanor as per 8 U.S.C. §
Id.
Id. at 448.
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 448 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 445 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 596.
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to bear arms is a fundamental right granted to the individual, in the same
vein as the Fourth Amendment.62
While the Court never addressed undocumented persons in its decision, it wrote that it started with a “strong presumption that the Second
Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”63
The Court tried to define the meaning of “the people” in the operative
clause of the Amendment by referencing the Fourth Amendment VerdugoUrquidez case and its “political community” language, writing that “in all
six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the people,’ the term
unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an
unspecified subset.”64 This “unspecified subset” could pose a problem; yet,
again, the Court pulled this language from Verdugo-Urquidez, a case that in
itself held the Fourth Amendment simply does not extend to aliens outside
of the United States.65 It left slightly ambiguous, however, the case of undocumented persons within the United States.66
Like the Fourth Amendment, however, the Court wrote that the Second Amendment classifies a pre-existing right.67 The Court came to this
determination by looking at the history surrounding the amendment and the
fact that the amendment itself affirms only that the right guaranteed would
not be “infringed.”68 Because the amendment classifies a pre-existing right,
the court ensured that it is “not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither
is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”69 This
would suggest that the right to bear arms is not a right given to one by the
government but an inherent right in that of any human being; one does not
need a Constitution to guarantee it.70
The dissent, however, comprised of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, picked up on the apparent incongruity between the majority’s insistence that the same group of people protected by the Fourth
62. Id. at 580.
63. Id. at 581.
64. Id. at 580.
65. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
66. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis,
J., dissenting).
67. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
68. Id. at 592:
This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the
Second Amendment. We look to this because it has always been widely
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second
Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’
Id.
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876)).
70. Id.
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Amendment are also protected by the Second Amendment.71 Justice Stevens wrote:
The centerpiece of the Court’s textual argument is its insistence that the words “the people” as used in the Second
Amendment must have the same meaning, and protect the
same class of individuals, as when they are used in the First
and Fourth Amendments. According to the Court, in all
three provisions . . . “the term unambiguously refers to all
members of the political community, not an unspecified
subset.” But the Court itself reads the Second Amendment
to protect a “subset” significantly narrower than the class
of persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendments;
when it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of
the Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected
class to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” But the class of
persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendments is
not so limited; for even felons (and presumably irresponsible citizens as well) may invoke the protections of those
constitutional provisions. The Court offers no way to harmonize its conflicting pronouncements.72
Although the dissent specifically targeted the case of felons in its example,73 the case of undocumented persons and their constitutional right to
bear arms is not far off: the word “citizen[]” is, after all, used specifically
by the Court and the dissent in its example.74 For, if, as the majority argued,
the meaning of the Second Amendment and the Fourth Amendment are in
complicity, then “citizens” cannot, by logical extension, be the sole group
covered by the Second Amendment. The dissent itself pointed out this agitation in constitutional meaning.75 How does one synthesize the majority’s
interpretation, then, without including undocumented persons in the meaning of “the people” of the Second Amendment?
D.

THE PLENARY POWER OF CONGRESS

As Judge Dennis suggested in his dissenting opinion in PortilloMunoz, the question of whether undocumented persons qualify as part of
“the people” under the Second and Fourth Amendments is quite different
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) violates the Second Amendment. 76
This is in large part due to the fact that, as the majority in Portillo-Munoz
correctly noted, “[i]n its exercise of broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.”77 The scope of this Note is limited in that it does not
argue against Congress’s obvious plenary power over immigration law.78
As argued by the majority in Portillo-Munoz,79 and even the Supreme
Court in many instances,80 Congress has plenary power when deciding matters that pertain to immigration: “it is the business of the political branches
of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.”81
These courts have often recognized the fact that their powers are limited in
such ways and give much deference to Congress when deciding matters of
immigration.
Although it will not be contended that courts give Congress much deference in matters of immigration, it should also be noted, however, that
Congress’s power does have its limits if a particular provision is in violation of the Constitution.82 In the Supreme Court case of Almeida-Sanchez v.
76. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).
77. Id. at 441 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 (1976)).
78. As mentioned previously, Congress has power to regulate immigration laws as
per the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the Migration and Importation Clause,
and the War Power. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4;
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
79. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 441.
80. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 117 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“At the outset it is important to
recognize that the power of the federal courts is severely limited in the areas of immigration
and regulation of aliens.”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (White,
J., dissenting):
But the power of the National Government to exclude aliens from the
country is undoubted and sweeping. That the government of the United
States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it
could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control
of another power.
Id. at 291 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889)).
81. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84.
82. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 496 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994):
The INS argues that Smirnoff’s statement was justified under Section
287(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), which gives INS agents
statutory “power without warrant to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to remain in the United States.” However, as the Supreme Court made clear in a case involving the very same
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United States,83 the Court itself wrote that “[i]t is clear, of course, that no
Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution.”84 Thus, although Congress does have power in these matters, Congress’s provisions
are still subject to judicial review, even if the review is highly reverential of
Congress’s power.
III.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND “PERSONHOOD”

In the Population Estimates Report authorized by the Department of
Homeland Security,85 as of January 2010, there are 10.8 million undocumented persons living in the United States.86 Although there has been a one
million person decline between 2007 and 2009 (decreased from 11.6 million), it was attributed to the fact that the United States was “in the midst of
[an] economic recession.”87 However, before the recession, the population
increase of undocumented persons was approximated at an average annual
increase of 500,000 per year.88 Can these millions of people be denied “personhood” status and, thus, any protection under the Constitution? Certainly
not under the Fourteenth Amendment.89
provision of the INA, “no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of
the Constitution.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975)).
83. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266.
84. Id. at 272.
85. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF
THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY
2010
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.
86. Id. In its estimates, the Department of Homeland Security believes that 8.6
million (eighty percent) of the total of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population are from the
North America region (this includes Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America).
Id. About 1.0 million of the total are from Asia, and 0.8 million are from South America.
About sixty-three percent of unauthorized immigrants are between the ages of twenty-five
and forty-four years old. Id. It is estimated that fifty-seven percent in this age group are
male. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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As early in American case law as the close of the nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court affirmed the notion that not only United States citizens
are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. In the oft-cited case of Wong Wing v. United States,90 the
court considered it a notion of foundational fairness:
The term “person,” used in the [Fourteenth Amendment], is
broad enough to include any and every human being within
the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is
entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen
is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country
in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws.91
It seems that this foundational notion espoused by James Madison did not
die as soon as the ink on the page dried.92
Justice Matthews, speaking for the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,93
wrote in an inspired manner:
[T]he fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness . . . are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious
progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that . . .
the government of the commonwealth “may be a government of laws and not of men.”94
That is, in any modern civilization that takes seriously the notion that everyone is to be protected equally under its laws, we must look past the subjective and also take seriously the objectivity of the laws. Although this was

Id. (emphasis added). This Note includes the Fifth Amendment in its analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment by implication, the difference being that the Fifth Amendment applies to
the federal government. Thus, when aliens are subjected to federal removal proceedings, the
Fifth Amendment commands that those “removal proceedings be fundamentally fair.” See
Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause mandates that removal hearings be fundamentally fair.”).
90. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 234 (1896) (in addition to declaring
that non-citizens were covered by the Due Process Clause, the Court also declared that noncitizens were entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights).
91. Id. at 242 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. MADISON, supra note 1, at 556.
93. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
94. Id. at 370.
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most certainly easier said than done,95 this philosophy as a whole was certainly weighing on the minds of the Justices, and non-citizens were found to
retain Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Almost one hundred years later, and most recently, in the Supreme
Court case of Plyler v. Doe,96 the Court for the first time made it exceptionally clear that the Fourteenth Amendment applied not simply to “noncitizens” but to undocumented persons as well.97 In this case, a Texas statute threatened to withhold from school districts any funding for the education of children who were not legally admitted into the United States.98 In
holding that undocumented persons were safeguarded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that this statute violated that
clause, the Court leapt headfirst into declaring who exactly were “persons”
under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens,
because of their immigration status, are not “persons within
the jurisdiction” of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to the equal protection of Texas law. We
reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a “person” in any ordinary
sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in
this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as
“persons” guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.99
Thus, the Court made it impossible to claim that undocumented persons
were not “persons” that could claim Fourteenth Amendment rights; in fact,
the Court implied that to claim otherwise would be nearly nonsensical.100
The Court further echoed the language of James Madison and the
Court in Wong Wing v. United States101 in writing that although a person
95. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393 (1856). See generally Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear
Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L REV. 1521 (2010):
[Dred Scott], for the first time, expressly equated “the people” in the
Constitution with citizens of the United States . . . . While overruled by
the Fourteenth Amendment and vilified as a low point in American jurisprudence, the case reveals a great deal about the relationships among
race, citizenship, and firearms.
Id. at 1550.
96. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
97. Id. at 210.
98. Id. at 206.
99. Id. at 210.
100. Id.
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might have entered the United States unlawfully, that person is still within
the territory of the United States and, thus, “is subject to the full range of
obligations imposed by the State’s civil and criminal laws. And until he
leaves the jurisdiction . . . he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws
that a State may choose to establish.”102 Accordingly, it is firmly established that whether a non-resident remains in the United States legally or
illegally,103 that person is beyond any doubt considered a “person,” and not
some shadow of a person, who is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment benefits.104
B.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS APPLICABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED
PERSONS

These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensa101. See MADISON, supra note 1, at 556; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 242 (1896).
102. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215. The Court further invokes the notion of the inhumanity
and disparagement of the American philosophy in finding that these people, who are definitely present in the United States, are not truly a “person”:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this
country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders. This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The
existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
Id. at 218-19.
103. See CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 6.02 (2011):
These constitutional and statutory mandates mean that noncitizens in the
United States are protected against arbitrary deprivation of their property
and that they are entitled generally to the same procedural safeguards as
citizens in criminal prosecutions, civil litigation, and administrative proceedings. Such constitutional protections shield those who are here illegally as well as those who have lawful status.
Id.
104. See also Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023, 1025 (1975) (“We can readily agree
that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to
aliens within the United States and even to aliens whose presence here is illegal.” (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)); see also Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(“It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in
due process of law.”); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D.
Ill. 1936).
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ble freedoms. Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the
individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled
search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.

– Justice Jackson105
Although it is well established that undocumented persons qualify as
“persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment,106 the
Fourth Amendment rights that undocumented persons retain are murkier
and less streamlined.107 The Supreme Court, in the 1984 case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,108 held that the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment did not apply to civil deportation
proceedings unless the violation of the Fourth Amendment is “egregious”
or “might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained.”109 This “egregious” violation
exception, however, provides the basis for many motions to suppress evidence in immigration cases.110 Further, many lower courts have taken this
holding to mean that the Supreme Court assumes there to be a Fourth
Amendment right for undocumented persons.111
In the five to four decision of Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court held
that, in accordance with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rulings,
“[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding.”112 Thus, even though the search initially conducted might
have been impermissible on Fourth Amendment grounds, the exclusionary

105. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
106. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
(emphasis added)).
108. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
109. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51.
110. Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings: A General Overview, THE LEGAL
ACTION
CENTER,
5
(Oct.
12,
2011),
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/practice-advisory-motions-to-suppressin-removal-proceedings-a-general-overview.pdf [hereinafter THE LEGAL ACTION CENTER].
111. See Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 624 (5th Cir. 2006) (“In preVerdugo-Urquidez cases, the Supreme Court had assumed, and we have explicitly held, that
the Fourth Amendment applies to aliens.”).
112. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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rule is not applicable and deportation is still possible.113 Further, the Court
found that Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) provided its own
exhaustive rules that provided against Fourth Amendment violations by its
officers114: “[n]ew immigration officers receive instruction and examination
in Fourth Amendment law, and others receive periodic refresher courses in
law.”115 This suggested that resorting to the exclusionary rule was unnecessary because, apparently, immigration officers would conform to the
rules.116
However, the Court, writing that it “[does] not condone any violations
of the Fourth Amendment that may have occurred in the arrests of the respondents,”117 carved out what seemed to be an exception to the finding that
the exclusionary rule did not apply in civil deportation proceedings: “Finally, we do not deal here with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”118
Disagreeing with the majority’s finding that the application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings was unlikely to “provide
significant deterrence,”119 the dissent pointed out:
The suggestion that alternative remedies, such as civil suits,
provide adequate protection is unrealistic. Contrary to the
situation in criminal cases, once the Government has improperly obtained evidence against an illegal alien, he is
removed from the country and is therefore in no position to
file civil actions in federal courts. Moreover, those who are
legally in the country but are nonetheless subjected to illegal searches and seizures are likely to be poor and uneducated, and many will not speak English. It is doubtful that
the threat of civil suits by these persons will strike fear into

113. Id. at 1043; see also THE LEGAL ACTION CENTER, supra note 110, at 4 (“The
‘exclusionary rule’ is a judicially created remedy to prevent the introduction of evidence
obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation. Its purpose is not to provide relief to
the victim but to deter government officers from purposely engaging in similar misconduct
in the future.”).
114. Lopez-Menoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
115. Id. at 1045.
116. Id. at 1046 (“Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all
persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil
deportation proceedings will contribute materially to that end.” (emphasis added)).
117. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
118. Id. at 1050-51.
119. Id. at 1053 (White, J., dissenting).
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the hearts of those who enforce the Nation’s immigration
laws.120
Thus, the dissent found that the exclusionary rule should apply in deportation proceedings when deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment were
found.121 Indeed, what use is it to find a Fourth Amendment violation but
not be able to exclude the evidence found pursuant to that violation?122
In the Ninth Circuit case of Orhorhaghe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,123 the court found that an egregious violation of the Fourth
Amendment had been committed against the petitioner Orhorhaghe and,
consequently, the evidence discovered in the petitioner’s apartment as a
result of this violation was to be suppressed124: “The only reason for the
agents’ actions was that Orhorhaghe had a foreign-sounding name that
caused them to suspect that he was an illegal alien. Accordingly, the agents
violated the Fourth Amendment, and all evidence obtained as a result of the
encounter was the fruit of this violation.”125
As mentioned briefly above, INS agents turned up at Orhorhaghe’s
apartment without a warrant based upon the fact that he had a Nigeriansounding name.126 After looking into their computer system and verifying
that there was no record of Orhorhaghe’s lawful entry into the United
States, the agents presented themselves to Orhorhaghe, who asked if they
120. Id. at 1055.
121. Id. at 1060.
122. See James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Unconstitutional Search or Seizure As
Warranting Suppression of Evidence in Removal Proceeding, 40 A.L.R. FED. 2d 489 (2011).
In writing about the Lopez-Mendoza case, Buchwalter noted that “[a]lthough the egregious
violation principle was enunciated by only a plurality of the Court, the view of the four
dissenting Justices implicitly endorses the principle as well, as they argued for suppression
to be allowed across the board; thus, the principle was supported by eight members of the
Court with only Chief Justice Burger not allowing for suppression under any circumstances.” Id. at 502 (emphasis added). Thus, although already a close decision, almost a plurality
of the Justices (four) argued that in the case of a conscious Fourth Amendment violation,
suppression should be allowed without the added weight of exemplifying “egregiousness.”
Id. Four more requested that the principle of egregiousness be shown first before suppressing
illegally obtained evidence in a deportation proceeding. Id.
123. Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 505:
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings. However, the Court expressly left open the possibility that the exclusionary rule might still apply in cases involving “egregious violations
of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of
fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
obtained.”
Id. at 492-93 (citations omitted) (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51).
125. Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 499-500.
126. Id. at 491.
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had a warrant, to which they replied that they did not need one.127 After
receiving his half-hearted consent, the agents searched Orhorhaghe’s
apartment to find that he was in the United States illegally on an expired
visa and that he had tried to acquire a California birth certificate.128
Finding the agents’ premise for searching Orhorhaghe’s apartment to
be insufficient and the invitation inside to have been given under duress,129
the court wrote that “evidence must be excluded when it ‘is obtained by
deliberate violations of the fourth amendment, or by conduct a reasonable
officer should know is in violation of the Constitution.’”130 Finding that a
reasonable officer should have known the search being conducted was unlawful as per the Fourth Amendment, the court suppressed all evidence
found.131 The court even suppressed Orhorhaghe’s admission of illegality,
finding that it also was a “fruit of the unlawful search and seizure.”132
The Ninth Circuit also found an egregious constitutional violation of
an undocumented person’s Fourth Amendment rights in the case of Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.133 In this case, Gonzalez was a passenger in his father’s vehicle as they were driving to work
when two officers stopped the car and ascertained that Gonzalez did not
have documentation allowing him to reside legally in the United States.134
When testifying at Gonzalez’s motion to suppress hearing, one of the officers admitted there was nothing suspicious about the car in which Gonzalez’s father was driving or the way in which it was being driven. 135 However, one of the first factors that the officer mentioned in his decision to stop
the vehicle was the fact that Gonzalez and his father “appeared to be Hispanic.”136
Agreeing that Gonzalez was indeed held solely because of his Hispanic appearance, the court found that stopping someone in this way, based
upon their race alone, would be enough in and of itself to constitute an

127. Id.
128. Id. at 492.
129. Id. at 499-500.
130. Orhorhaghe v. INS 38 F.3d 488, 501 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Adamson v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)). The court also notes that it
“[has] long regarded racial oppression as one of the most serious threats to our notion of
fundamental fairness and consider[s] reliance on the use of race or ethnicity as a shorthand
for likely illegal conduct to be ‘repugnant under any circumstances.’” Id. at 503 (quoting
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994)).
131. Id. at 501.
132. Id. at 505 n.27.
133. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d 1441.
134. Id. at 1443.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.137 In explaining its reasoning, the court first mentioned the repugnancy of using race as a ruse for
illegal conduct and quoted the Supreme Court in reiterating that “discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently
wrong, and destructive to democratic society.”138 The court also mentioned
that INS officers receive widespread training in Fourth Amendment law,
and, thus, know when they have intentionally violated the law or have acted
with cognizant oversight of the Constitution.139 Hence, a reasonable officer
should have known that he or she was violating the Constitution.140 In its
conclusion, the court found that because Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment
rights were violated egregiously due to a race-based stop, the evidence
found (that of Gonzalez’s lack of paperwork) must be suppressed.141
It is important to note that whether or not the exclusionary rule is applied, in all of the cases mentioned above, the undocumented person was
deemed to have Fourth Amendment rights.142 In fact, the Gonzalez-Rivera
court emphatically wrote that “[f]ederal courts cannot countenance deliberate violations of basic constitutional rights. To do so would violate our judicial oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States.”143 This, again,
suggests that undocumented persons are allowed, as mentioned, these
“basic constitutional rights.”144 If that is the case, then in order to invoke
their Fourth Amendment rights, rationally, undocumented persons must be
included in the “the people” of the Fourth Amendment.
All of these assertions, however, seem to clash when brought into
comparison with the 1990 Supreme Court case of Verdugo-Urquidez.145
There seems to be a slight inconsistency with the Fourth Amendment’s
practical applicability to undocumented persons in certain cases and the
interpretation of who “the people” are in this amendment as interpreted by
the Supreme Court.146
Believing that Verdugo-Urquidez was a leader in a large narcotics
smuggling ring, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

137. Id. at 1451.
138. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1450-51 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)).
139. Id. at 1450.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1452.
142. See id.; see also Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 505 (9th Cir. 1994); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984).
143. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1448.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
146. See Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d 1441; see also Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d 488; United
States v. Juarez-Torres, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D.N.M. 2006).
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obtained a warrant for his arrest.147 A year later, Verdugo-Urquidez was
found by officers in Mexico and handed over to United States marshals.148
Subsequently, without authorization from the United States Justice Department or any United States Attorney’s Office, the DEA searched two of
Verdugo-Urquidez’s properties and detained certain documents.149
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that no constitutional transgression had occurred because of the fact that the Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred on foreign, and not American, soil.150
Thus, the majority held that the Fourth Amendment is only applicable in
protecting those within the jurisdiction of the United States.151
What did the Court have to say, however, about exactly who the
Fourth Amendment protects, rather than the locus it covers? In commenting
upon the Lopez-Mendoza case, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court wrote that a
“majority of Justices assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have
Fourth Amendment rights.”152 The key word is “assumed,” as the Court
went on to write that whether undocumented persons actually retain Fourth
Amendment rights was not the point of the decision in Lopez-Mendoza and
has never been formally decided by the Court.153
However, in the same vein, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court never decided upon whether undocumented persons present within the jurisdiction of
the United States possess Fourth Amendment rights.154 After all, the case
itself focused on the question of whether non-citizens, on foreign soil, retained these basic constitutional benefits.155 Interestingly enough, though,
the Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that undocumented persons on
American soil did possess Fourth Amendment rights156: “Even assuming
such aliens would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation is different from respondent’s. The illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza
were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some
societal obligations . . . .”157
147. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 263-64.
151. Id.
152. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
153. Id. at 272-73 (“Our statements in Lopez-Menoza are not dispositive of how the
Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such
a claim were squarely before us. Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections, their situation is different from respondent’s.”).
154. Id.; see also United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 446 (5th Cir. 2011)
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
155. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263-64.
156. Id. at 272-73.
157. Id.
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As was referred to earlier in this Note, within this decision, the majority decided instead to utilize a test in deciding upon who “the people” are in
the Fourth Amendment and, by implication, in all other amendments that
reference “the people”158:
“[T]he people” seems to have been a term of art employed
in select parts of the Constitution . . . . [I]t suggests that
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by
the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.159
So, although undocumented persons are not “part of a national community”
for the purposes of this test, in order to assert their basic Fourth Amendment constitutional right, they have to prove that they have “otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”160 In this case, because Verdugo-Urquidez had not yet developed these “substantial connections,” he was deemed to not have acquired
Fourth Amendment rights.161
The Court mentioned two different ways in which “substantial connections” can be established162: first, that the alien has entered the United
States voluntarily and second, that the alien has accepted some societal obligations.163 Legality was never brought up as a necessary criterion.164 Further, the Court was not explicit about how substantial “substantial” really
was.165 Yet, in the topic case of Portillo-Munoz, dissenting Circuit Judge
Dennis wrote that the Court had suggested in this case “that if the alien’s
presence . . . had been ‘prolonged’ for more than ‘a matter of days’ when
the search occurred, he could perhaps have been eligible to ‘claim the pro-

158. Id. at 265. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), for an instance in which the usage of this Fourth Amendment test for “the people” was also utilized
for the Second Amendment reference for the same group of people.
159. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 274-75.
162. Id. at 273.
163. Id.
164. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis,
J., dissenting) (“Nothing in Verdugo-Urquidez requires that the alien must be lawfully present in the United States in order to establish substantial connections.”).
165. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 292.
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tection of the Fourth Amendment.’”166 This advances the notion that perhaps “substantial” connections are not as “substantial” as we think they
need to be.
Again, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court never decided the issue of the
Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented persons on United States
soil.167 It did, nevertheless, mention the fact that a majority of the Court
believed there to be Fourth Amendment rights for undocumented persons,
even if this was never decided squarely before the Court.168 It also laid out a
test for determining who exactly are “the people” mentioned in this
amendment.169 Further, this test leaves lots of wiggle room open for undocumented persons to be considered as part of “the people.” In his dissenting
opinion on the decision before the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote:
I cannot place any weight on the reference to “the people”
in the Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting its protections. . . . [E]xplicit recognition of “the right of the people” to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to
underscore the importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may assert it.170
C.

“THE PEOPLE” OF THE SECOND AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS

Determining who exactly “the people” are compromised of within the
Second Amendment seems to be quite a difficult task. This task, however,
becomes a bit more simplified when one realizes that “the people” of the
Fourth Amendment are also the very same group of people protected within
the Second Amendment.171 As argued above, the Fourth Amendment is
often used to defend the rights of undocumented persons.172 Although the
Supreme Court has not squarely decided this issue, a majority of the Court
assumes already that undocumented persons retain a Fourth Amendment
right.173 If the same group of people is protected in the Second Amendment
166. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 446 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
167. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
168. Id.; see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1984) (“The Government of the United States bears an obligation to obey the Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those officers was to be
used in civil deportation proceedings.”).
169. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
170. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008).
172. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 505 (9th Cir. 1994); see also INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984).
173. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
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as it is in the Fourth, it naturally follows that undocumented persons are a
part of “the people” of the Second Amendment as well.174
The Second and Fourth Amendments are, first and foremost, not simply similar because they both encompass the same group of “people”175: this
notion flows into another—the fact that both amendments also exemplify
individual rights used to protect one from unauthorized power by the government.176 In describing the protections of the Constitution, in particular
the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States wrote that “[t]he needs of law enforcement stand
in constant tension with the Constitution’s protections of the individual
against certain exercises of official power.”177 To further this concept, in his
Note, Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the
Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, George A. Mocsary wrote
that “the Constitution consistently uses the term ‘right’ to refer to a protected personal interest and ‘power’ to refer to an enumerated governmental
prerogative.”178 Therefore, the key to the concept of the protections of the
Bill of Rights is that of the notion that the weak, easily overpowered individual should have protections against a large, strong government.179
The belief that both amendments protect the individual right against
abuses by the government and the idea that all of these individuals are, in
fact, the same individuals go hand-in-hand. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in going over the history of the Second
Amendment in the case of Parker v. District of Columbia,180 elucidated:
In
determining
whether
the Second
Amendment’s guarantee is an individual one, or some sort of collective right, the most important word is the one the drafters chose to describe the holders of the right—“the people.”
That term is found in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments. It has never been doubted that these
provisions were designed to protect the interests
of individuals against government intrusion, interference,
or usurpation.181
174. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 444 (5th Cir. 2011).
175. Heller, 554 U.S. at 596.
176. Id. at 592; see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973).
177. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added).
178. George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of
Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2113, 2172 (2008).
179. Id.
180. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 382.
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The principle that these rights are individual and not granted to a specifically laid out subset of people, such as purely to the militia in the Second Amendment, espouses the idea that the right existed before the government formed.182 After all, the Second Amendment simply guarantees
that the right to bear arms “shall not be infringed.”183 The Heller Court,184
quoting United States v. Cruikshank,185 held that this individual right is “not
a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence.”186 In essence, this is a right that is
not granted by any government but that one holds inherently.187
As mentioned briefly above, the Second and Fourth Amendments both
protect the same group of “the people.”188 In the Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Emerson,189 the court wrote emphatically:
There is no evidence in the text of the Second Amendment,
or any other part of the Constitution, that the words “the
people” have a different connotation within the Second
Amendment than when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a whole,
strongly suggests that the words “the people” have precisely the same meaning within the Second Amendment as
without.190
Therefore, the individual rights of “the people,” not determinative upon the
Constitution for their existence, provide a safety net for the same group of
people within each amendment.191 The Parker court agreed,192 explaining
simply that “[t]he natural reading of ‘the right of the people’ in the Second
Amendment would accord with usage elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.”193
Both the Emerson court and the Parker court derived their positions
from the Supreme Court itself in the Fourth Amendment case of VerdugoUrquidez, discussed previously.194 In setting out its two-part test for deter182. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280 (1897) (illuminating the roots of
the Bill of Rights).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
184. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
185. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
186. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 596.
189. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
190. Id. at 227-28.
191. Id.
192. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
193. Id. at 381.
194. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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mining who exactly “the people” were,195 Verdugo-Urquidez suggested that
all uses of the phrase “the people” were consistent.196 As George Mocsary
noted, “[t]he Supreme Court has declared that the term ‘people’ should be
construed identically everywhere in the Constitution.”197
Nevertheless, the Portillo-Munoz court reasoned, contrary to what the
Supreme Court has held,198 that the Second Amendment is not an individual
right granted for protective purposes against abuses by the government but
an affirmative right granted to one graciously by the powers vested in the
government.199 In erring on this point, the Portillo-Munoz court led its reasoning down a path in which it finally found that Armando Portillo-Munoz,
a man who was caught with a gun simply because it was a part of his job to
carry one, was not considered a part of “the people” of the Second Amendment.200 The court, however, did acquiesce to the fact that the phrase “the
people” is used similarly in the context of the Fourth Amendment as well as
the Second.201 With the knowledge that it was likely that similar groups of
“the people” would thus be covered under both amendments, the court
simply washed its hands of the matter by writing that the Supreme Court
had never decided upon the issue of whether undocumented persons are
covered under the Fourth Amendment.202
As explained above, however, the issue is not that simple; for, a majority of the Supreme Court already assumes that undocumented persons retain
Fourth Amendment rights,203 and there is much case law to support the notion that undocumented persons are covered under the Fourth Amendment,
even if the exclusionary rule does not apply in some cases.204 Courts could
try to argue that the scope of “the people” within the Second and Fourth
Amendments is different,205 but this would not comport with the Supreme
Court’s view that the Bill of Rights refers to “the people” in the same light
throughout.206 Pratheepan Gulasekaram, in his article “The People” of the

195. Id. at 265-66.
196. Id. at 265.
197. Mocsary, supra note 178, at 2171.
198. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008).
199. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011).
200. Id. at 442.
201. Id. at 440.
202. Id.
203. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
204. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984); see also GonzalezRivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Juarez-Torres, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D.N.M. 2006).
205. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
206. Mocsary, supra note 178, at 2171.
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Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms,207 hit the nail
on the head when he wrote:
Undoubtedly, one could argue that Heller gun rights are sui
generis and that “the people” in the Second Amendment is
narrower and more precisely defined than in other constitutional provisions. While this interpretation is plausible, it
would undermine the Heller majority’s painstaking exegesis of “the people,” including the guidance sought from
other constitutional allusions to the phrase. In addition, it
ironically would contradict Heller’s fundamental holding
regarding the individualized and self-protective characteristics of the right to bear arms. If “the people” referenced in
the Second Amendment meant citizens, while the same
phrase in the Fourth Amendment meant a broader class of
persons with substantial connections, then the Second
Amendment is exceptional in requiring obligation and loyalty to—and recognition by—the state in order to seek its
protection. Conditioning the right on an intimate tie to the
state suggests that the Amendment is not actually about
self-defense, but about state-defense. . . . However, Heller
rejected this reading in its characterization of the Second
Amendment right as an individual right to self-defense, and
therefore its tightening of “the people” relative to its other
uses in the Constitution is plausible only at the expense of
its keystones.208
Therefore, as Gulasekaram eloquently noted, if the people of the Second
Amendment and the people of the Fourth Amendment are in fact the same
people, “citizens” cannot be the sole group of benefactors under these
amendments.209 Gulasekaram pointed out, simply, “[i]n light of history,
text, and logic, ‘the people’ of the Second Amendment must include more
than citizens.”210
In light of these findings, the Portillo-Munoz court’s reasoning for disallowing Armando Portillo-Munoz the right to carry a firearm seems fatally
flawed.211 The court, knowing that it had the precedent of Verdugo-

207. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship
and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521 (2010).
208. Gulasekaram, supra note 207, at 1538-39.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1580.
211. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Urquidez to deal with,212 acknowledged the fact that the same group of
people were covered in both the Fourth and Second Amendments but tried
to sideline this issue by claiming that undocumented persons were not covered under the Fourth Amendment.213 Then, the court, flying in the face of
Heller,214 established that the Second Amendment is an affirmative right
and not a protective right granted to the individual.215 With this misguided
piece laid out, the court found that Portillo-Munoz was not a part of “the
people” of the Second Amendment.216 As the dissent noted, however, this
decision has far-reaching consequences.217 Because, simply put, if undocumented persons are not a part of “the people” of the Second Amendment,
then they cannot be a part of “the people” of the rest of the amendments
that cover “the people.”218
IV.

CONCLUSION

The majority’s holding in Portillo-Munoz,219 that Armando PortilloMunoz is not a part of “the people” and thus has no Second Amendment
rights, does not comport logically with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court.220 Not only does the court not follow precedent in that the Second
Amendment is an individual right not granted to one by the Constitution 221
and not an affirmative right as the court assumes, but the court also then
dismisses the idea that the same group of people are covered under both the
Second and Fourth Amendment by noting that there is no precedent for
finding that undocumented persons are covered under the Fourth Amendment.222 Although the Verdugo-Urquidez Court noted that the Supreme
Court has never decided the issue of whether undocumented persons retain
Fourth Amendment rights, it noted correctly that a majority of Justices already assume that undocumented persons retain these rights.223 Further,

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
Court has
Rights.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440-41.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Mocsary, supra note 178, at 2171. As noted above, this is because the Supreme
held that the same “people” are depicted analogously throughout the Bill of
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 592.
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
United States Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990).
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there is ample case law to support the view that undocumented persons retain Fourth Amendment rights.224
Although it is arguable that undocumented persons retain Fourth
Amendment rights, it is without a doubt that undocumented persons are
already covered under the Constitution within the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.225 As the Supreme Court held in
Plyler, “[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely
a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”226 Therefore, undocumented
persons are already covered under provisions within the Constitution.
As the dissenting opinion in Portillo-Munoz, written by Circuit Judge
Dennis, correctly stated,227 to hold that Portillo-Munoz is not a part of “the
people” would, in effect, mean that “millions of similarly situated residents
of the United States are ‘non-persons’ who have no rights to be free from
unjustified searches of their homes and bodies and other abuses, nor to
peaceably assemble or petition the government.”228 To hold such would put
these millions of people, and even American citizens, in dangerous territory.
The calling into question of who makes up “the people” or who is a
“person” hopelessly reminds us of a past, as exemplified by the Dred Scott
case,229 in which African Americans were not treated as people but as property.230 It is time for Americans to collectively realize that we are only as
strong as our weakest link. The American Civil Liberties Union is undoubtedly correct when it writes: “[u]pholding the rights of immigrants is important to us all. When the government has the power to deny legal rights
and due process to one vulnerable group, everyone’s rights are at risk.”231
Does this nation truly pride itself on the idea that there is equality under the
law for everyone232 and that justice is blind, or do such beliefs only stretch
so far as an “us versus them” mentality can stretch? As undocumented persons are expected to abide by American laws, they should also have rights
and be protected under such laws,233 not simply by reason of their being

224. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Orhorhaghe v.
INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Juarez-Torres, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1108
(D.N.M. 2006).
225. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
226. Id.
227. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
228. Id.
229. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
230. Id.
231. Immigrants’
Rights,
ACLU.COM,
http://www.aclu.org/humanrights/immigrants-rights (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
232. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219.
233. See MADISON, supra note 1, at 556.
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within this nation’s jurisdiction but by virtue of their being, as Americans
are too, human.
DOROTA B. GIBALA*
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